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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
act. Three different procedures, known as registration by notification,
registration by co-ordination, and registration by qualification, are
provided for. All of these are fundamentally patterned upon the phi-
losophy of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 which requires disclosure
of pertinent facts as a condition precedent to a public offering. The
state does not purport to pass upon the merits of the securities, but
rather to assure that all required relevant information is available to
the investor.
Administration of the act is vested in the Director of Licenses who
is to be assisted by an advisory committee to be appointed by the
Director.
In addition to requiring disclosure, the act prohibits fraudulent and
misleading practices, requires registration of brokers, dealers, sales-
men, and investment advisers, and creates certain statutory civil
remedies. The act also contains detailed provisions exempting certain
securities and certain transactions from the scope of the law.
In view of the adoption of this detailed and technical act, it behooves
members of the Bar who represent clients contemplating a "public
offering of securities" to familiarize themselves with the provisions of
the statute. By way of admonition, the phrase "public offering" is not
susceptible of precise definition, but the federal courts in interpreting
this phrase in the Federal Securities Act of 1933 have in marginal cases
shown a distinct disposition to hold that the offering is "public" and,
therefore, within the scope of the act. In case of doubt, it will be
advisable to examine the federal interpretations before determining
that an offering is not public and, consequently, not covered by the act.
J. GoRDoN GosE
CRIMINAL LAW
Chapter 229-Washington's Anti-Shoplifting Statute. The exact
annual amount actually deprived this nation's store owners by shop-
lifters is, quite realistically, impossible to know. Yet, by almost any
standard, estimates reveal that the dollar-value sums are staggering.
One author concludes that the total national loss in 1948 was over
$246,106,000.00, and a more conservative source estimates this nation's
average annual shoplifting loss is somewhat in excess of $100,000,-
000.00.2 On the state level, it is reported that $12,500,000.00 is taken




annually in Pennsylvania3 and from $2,000,000.00 to $3,000,000.00
in Maryland." Florida's legislature solemnly proclaimed in the pre-
amble to its anti-shoplifting statute that its yearly loss was $4,500,-
000.00.' Indiana's loss totals at $15,000,000.00.' Washington has
had a similar experience."
In addition to the annual dollar-amounts of goods lost, shoplifting
accounts for an increase in underworld activities such as "fences," etc."
But, since much shoplifting is done by this nation's housewives, juve-
niles, and other non-professionals because they cannot withstand
enticings offered by alluring advertising or unguarded displays,9 there
is reason to believe that the multiplied secondary impact flowing from
amateur shoplifting does not further pernicious criminal ramifications
and carry overtones necessarily inherent in other types of theft.10
Neither are neurotic kleptomaniac 1' numerous nor do they offer
serious problems having extended criminal consequences. 2 Apart
from the amateurs, professional petty pilferers do present perplexing
"hard core" crime problems. Their activity is intimately connected
with organized crime, particularly narcotics, through the underworld
network of planned thievery and modes of disposing of professional
plunder.1
Though shoplifting easily qualifies under petit larceny statutes,'
only an insignificant proportion of the total offenses known to shop-
keepers is reported. For example, it is recorded that in 1951 the De-
8 Comment, 61 Dscx. L. Rxv. 255 (1957).
4 Comment, 19 MD. L. REv. 28, 29 (1959).
5 22 FLA. STAT. ANN., § 811.022 (1958 Cum. P.P.).8 Note, 32 IND. L. J. 20 (1957) n. 48.
7 See, Seattle Times, Sunday Magazine Section, April 5, 1959, where the estimate
is $1,000.00 per month per major market area.SSee, SUTHERLAND, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF (1937), and JANDY & FLoCHr,
NARCOTIC ADDICTION AS A FACTOR IN PTIT LARCENY IN Dmorr 13 (1937).
9 See, POLLAK, THE CRIMINAL= OF WOMEN (1950); SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES
or CRIMINOLOGY 219, 233 (5th ed. Cressey 1955); GRoss, AD.AM & ADAM, CRMINAL
INvESTIGATIoN 509 (3d ed. 1934); Cracking Down on Shoplifters, BusinEss WEEK,
Nov. 1, 1952, p. 58; ANDERSON, FURTHER STUDIES oF DELINQUENT PERsoNALrrIEs IN
PROCEEDINGS oF THE Am. PRISON ASSOCATIONI 435-45 (1919).
10 See, MACDONALD, CRIME IS A BUSINESS 220 (1939).
'
11DAvIDsoN, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 326, 329 (1952) ; HENDERSON, PSYCHOPATHIC
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR IN MENTAL ABNORMAL.ITY AND CRIME 118(1944) ; A Kleptomaniac's Mind, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1937, p. 43.1 Comment, 62 YAL L. J. 788 no. 17, 22.
13 See, AssN or GRAND JURORS or N. Y. COUNTY, CRIMINAL RECEIms IN THE
UNITED STATES (1928) ; SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY (5th ed. Cressey,
1955) ; SUTHERLAND, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF (1937). Professional petty thievery
is linked closely to drug addiction, and many who are addicted steal in order to pay
the exorbitant sales price of illicit drugs. See, Hearings Before Committee on Ways
and Means on H.R. 3490 and H.R. 348, 82 Cong. 1st Sess. 41 (1951). The average
addict's weekly needs cost anywhere from $50 to $250. See, 62 YALE L. J. 751 (1953)
n. 48, and King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act, 62 YALE L. J. 736 (1953).14 See, RCW 9.54.090 and RCW 9.54.010.
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partment of Police in Detroit, Michigan, received reports of 428 cases
of shoplifting while the protection service of a single Detroit depart-
ment store detected over twice that number; likewise, only two cases
of shoplifting were reported to the police of Worcester, Massachusetts,
even though the city has a population of over 270,000.1s An important
reason for the shopkeeper's reluctance to apprehend petty thieves is
found in the merchant's fear of liability for false imprisonment, false
arrest, assault and battery, and slander.16 Briefly, his dilemma 7 lies
in a conflict between his desire to use profitable modem merchandising
display and sales techniques, yet protect his goods from theft, versus
his fear of possible tort or criminal prosecution which may be accom-
panied by a subsequent general loss of good will. 8
To ease the merchant's dilemma for our shopkeepers, the Washing-
ton legislature created a new crime of shoplifting, 9 a gross misde-
meanor. Since the legislature attached no fixed statutory punishment
to the chapter, the new crime will carry a maximum penalty of county
jail imprisonment for not more than one year, or a fine up to $1,000.00,
or both.2" Section 2 allows peace officers, who are defined as duly
appointed city, county or state law enforcement officers,2' to arrest
15 Comment, 62 YALE L. 3. 788, 792 (1953). For a comparison of the disposition of
shoplifting cases in sixty-five American cities during 1951 (including Everett, Yakima
and Tacoma), see appendix at end of Comment cited herein.
For an excellent discussion of legal doctrines circumscribing the protection and
recapture of merchandise from shoplifters, see Comment, 46 ILi. L. Rav. 887 (1952),
completed in 47 Nw. U. L. Rav. 82 (1952).
"7 Examples of the merchant's dilemma are Collyer v. S. H. Kress, 44 P2d 638
(Cal. App. 1935), rev'd 5 Cal2d 175, 54 P.2d 20 (1936), and Sennett v. Zimmerman,
50 Wn2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957). See also, Note, 32 IND. L. J. 20 (1957) and
Comment, 61 Dicx. L. Rav. 255, 260-65 (1957).
18 It would be the rare case in which there would be time sufficient to secure a
warrant for the arrest of an unidentified shoplifter before he departed with his plunder.
Also, if the merchant stops a suspect without intention of turning him over to the police
or prosecuting him, he may "imprison" (perhaps falsely) rather than "arrest" the
suspect See, McGlone v. Landreth, 200 Okla. 425, 195 P2d 268 (1948) ; Crews-Beggs
Dry Goods Co. v. Bayle, 97 Colo. 568, 51 P.2d 1026 (1935).
19 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 229 provides: "A person who willfully takes posses-
sion of any goods ... of the value of less than seventy-five dollars offered for sale by
any... store.., without the consent of the seller, with the intention of converting
such goods .... to his own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, is guilty
of a gross misdemeanor of shoplifting." After Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wn.2d 649,
314 P.2d 414 (1957), noted, 33 WASH. L. Rav. 203 (1958) one wonders the need of
this statute, even though it does go the additional step of immunizing arrests based
upon a charge made.
2o RCW 9.92.020.2 1 Per § 4 of the act. The immunity is granted only to peace officers, but since
Sennett v. Zimmerman, 50 Wn.2d 649 (1957), presumably the appointment of munici-
pally deputized store employees would carry "the same powers of arrest as are con-
ferred upon police officers who are regularly employed by the city." Id. at 652. Other
state statutes allow a reasonable detention of a suspect by the merchant without in-
curring civil or criminal liability. See CODs ALA. (1957 Supp.) c. 53, § 334; LAWS
Aiaz. (1958, c. 8 (§§ 13-674-5); LAWS UTAH (1957), c. 166; see Comment, 19 MD.
L. Ray. 28, 33-37 (1959) for discussion.
[Vor-34
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upon a charge being made and without a warrant any person whom
they have reasonable cause to believe has shoplifted or attempted to
do so. In addition, by another section (and this is the reason the
statute is important) reasonable cause is made a defense to both civil
and criminal actions brought against a peace officer for false arrest,
false imprisonment, or unlawful detention by a person suspected of
shoplifting.
The statute raises many questions which cannot be fully canvassed
here and I shall point out only a few. First, the torts of assault,
battery, and slander are not specifically provided against by way of
defense and these torts, especially assault and ofttimes battery, are
many times included in false imprisonment or false arrest. 2 Similarly,
it might be that publicly to charge one with having "taken" a thing
under circumstances which show an intent to charge larceny is slander-
ous and actionable without proof of special damages.2 These prob-
lems can be solved by stretching the "intent" of the legislature to cover
them; yet, this is a penal statute which derogates against the common
law and the rights of personal liberty and, therefore, should be strictly
construed on these counts. Secondly, the legislature made no provision
for the length of time a peace officer having reasonable cause might
detain a suspect, but it probably would be a "reasonable" time. This
label causes great confusion because that period of detention which is
unreasonable varies.2" Obviously, the problem of what constitutes "rea-
sonable cause" is beset with difficulties: Is an honest but unfounded
or mistaken belief reasonable cause? 25 Is reasonable cause synonymous
with probable cause? Is its absence to be measured by knowledge or
intent?2" Is reasonable cause a question for the jury or does the jury
resolve factual disputes only and determine the existence of the cir-
cumstances so the court may finally decide whether there was reason-
able cause? Will any charge justify arrest or only a reasonable charge
as determined by the peace officer?
Constitutional questions create even greater problems and their
resolutions are equally unclear. To grant immunity from false arrest,
false imprisonment, and unlawful detention might well be an infringe-
22 See, Vandiveer v. Charters, 110 Cal. App. 347, 294 Pac. 440 (1931) ; Parrish v.
Boysell Mfg. Co., 188 S.E. 817 (1937); Comment, 24 TENx. L. REv. 1177, 1181 (1957).
2333 Am. JuiL Libel and Slander § 56. See Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn.
App. 357, 362, 172 S.W.2d 13 (1943).
24 Compare Collyer v. S. H. Kress, 5 Cal.2d 175, 181, 54 P.2d 20 (1936) with
Jacques v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 244 Mass. 438, 138 N.E. 843 (1923).
25 See, Hurst v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 241 Mo. 73, 145 S.W.2d 992, 995 (1940).2 See, Director General of Railroads v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25 (1923).
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ment on the rights of the person to be secure in his person as protected
by the fourteenth amendment incorporating the fourth." Washington's
anti-shoplifting statute grants a peace officer, upon a charge being
made and without a warrant, the right to arrest for a misdemeanor not
committed in his presence. The rub comes in that the statute attempts
to allow peace officers, without a warrant, to arrest for unseen mis-
demeanors which are not breaches of the peace thereby covering new
areas not previously allowed under the common law. 8 Usually peace
officers are allowed to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
only in cases of breaches of the peace, 9 and a few states go further
in allowing arrests for misdemeanors committed in their presence.8 "
In addition, the statute may have to meet other hurdles in fourteenth
amendment and state constitutional guarantees, such as not being void
as class legislation since it neither applies to all gross misdemeanors
nor to all situations of a similar nature.81
The merchant, by this statute, has much to allay his fears about
prosecutions for false arrests because it grants a specific defense to
his deputized employee who can arrest upon a charge being made. In
addition, he or his deputized employee can still take advantage of the
many existing flaws in the remedies for illegal arrest. For example,
personal suits against peace officers are many times fruitless because
of their financial condition; municipalities are seldom liable because
of the governmental-proprietary distinction, and many exceptions are
made to the rule of respondeat superior.
Two significant questions appear in any appraisal of this statute
for they are intrinsic to any changes in the law of arrest.2 Briefly
stated, the legislature must consider (1) all alternative techniques and
2 See, e.g., Giacona v. State, 298 S.W2d 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957) ; Comment,
19 MD. L. Rav. 28, 35 (1959) ; Comment, 24 TENN. L. Rv. 1177, 1184 (1957). This is
also the position of the American Civil Liberties Union.
28 See, RESTATEMENT, TORLTS § 121, comment e (1934) ; Annot., 1 ALR 575 (1918);-
In re Kellam, 55 Kan. 700, 41 Pac. 960 (1895). Giacona v. State, 298 S.W.2d 587(Tex. Crim. App. 1957) said that "[T]he arrest of a person upon pure supposition or
belief is in violation of both state and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom
from unreasonable arrests." See, Machen, Arrest Without A Warrant In Mis-
demeanor Cases, 33 N.C. L Ray. 17 (1954).2 9 Shoplifting has never been deemed a breach of the peace. Comment, 46 ILL. L.
REv. 887, 895 (1952) n. 19.
so 5ee, ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APEA 14-23 (1947) and
Mitchell v. Hughes, 104 Wash. 231, 176 Pac. 26 (1918) ; see also, State v. Gibbons,
118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922) ; Tacoma v. Houston, 27 Wn.2d 215, 177 P.2d 886(1947) ; Note, 33 WASH. L. REv. 205 (1958) n. 18. But, in addition, Washington holds
that a peace officer is entitled to make an arrest without a warrant when he has reason-
able cause to believe that a crime is being committed in his presence. Sennett v. Zim-
merman, 50 Wn.2d 649, 314 P.2d 414 (1957).
81 To RCW 9.54.090 for example.
22 ORFp, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 47 (1947).
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methods of making arrests and arrange them according to their order
of efficiency and effectiveness, and (2) from this array it must select
those which it will allow peace officers to use because those selected
methods are in keeping with the higher goals to which our society is
dedicated. The first function easily can be performed on the grounds
of efficiency, merely selecting means to a single end, but the second is
tougher because it poses considerations of ends as well as means.
Detection and arrest of suspected persons are not the sole ends of
government, and efficient police practices can easily be incompatible
with other overriding ends of society. The legislature has tried to
protect merchants from the difficult, risky, and expensive job of
adequately detecting shoplifting. In doing so, it may have created a
trap for the unwary and unwise peace officer who, on a moment's
notice, must determine whether he has reasonable cause and a consti-
tutional right to arrest without a warrant. From the consumer's view-
point, shopping might become likened to a poker game in that you
move your hands from sight at your peril. When the liberty and good
names of our responsible citizens hang in the balance, more care and
deliberation should be reflected by the legislative product.
ARvAI A. Momus
ELECTIONS
Judicial Elections-Primaries and General Elections. The prob-
lem presented is whether section 1 of chapter 247, Session Laws of
1959, relating to school district primary elections, and hereinafter
referred to as Laws 1959, repeals Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 101
(RCW 29.21.180), relating to procedure when no primary election
in certain offices, and hereinafter referred to as Laws 1955. Section 1
of Laws 1955, in turn, is said to have "repealed" some provisions of
Wash. Sess. Laws 1927, c. 155, covering the nomination and election
of judges, now appearing in RCW chapter 29.21 (particularly RCW
29.21.070), and hereinafter referred to as Laws 1927, and also Wash.
Sess. Laws 1933, c. 85, covering the nomination and election of justices
of the peace, also now appearing in RCW chapter 29.21 (particularly
RCW 29.21.070), and hereinafter referred to as Laws 1933. The
question is also raised whether such repeal of a "repealing act" will
revive the provisions of the earlier acts. It is this writer's opinion
that Laws 1955 is not a repealing act, but is an act supplementary to
19591
